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From: VIRAF P.. MULLA <>

Subject: Re: Anatomy of an Accident

Date: 03 Aug 1999 21:53:55 -0500


>
> Hi: Would it be possible for you to paste the text in
> your doc file into the message field itself ? It will
> help those of us who run UNIX machines (and cannot view
> doc files) to read your analysis. Thanks:

Yes Mr.Muhammed Khan will you please do that. We here in Godrej
can't read your message.

Thanks.


==========================
Viraf Mulla
C-20/14, Jeevan Bima Nagar,
Borivali (West)
Mumbai 400103
Tel: +91-22-8954510
E-mail: sncf@godrej.email
==========================

From: Jayant S <>

Subject: Rediff Article

Date: 03 Aug 1999 22:37:16 -0500


<A HREF="http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/aug/04rail.htm">http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/aug/04rail.htm</A>

Just posted on Rediff. Check it out.

-JS-

From: Jayant S <>

Subject: AWS and Accident Prevention

Date: 03 Aug 1999 23:28:06 -0500


Jishnu Mukerji wrote:
> Well said! It seems to me that all indications are that every possible
> safety interlocking was worked around to get the AA Express onto the
> down track in this case. Why would this be less likely if even more
> interlocking was in place? I think the fundamental issue of
inculcating
> a sense of responsibility and discipline in the entire human chain of
> operation is being overlooked.

Yes, either that, or a vital technology input that can
reduce the number of accidents caused by human failure: I
mean AWS (automatic warning system) installations that can
stop a train automatically if it enters an occupied section.
Mechanical systems, even if interlocked, would depend on
signalmen and drivers; track circuiting and automatic signalling
still puts the onus on drivers. AWS should remove that last
human link. Individual vigiliance and responsibility are
important, certainly, but there has to be a last-ditch
safeguard against mistakes.

I have not understood why introduction of AWS in India
is not linked with that of track circuiting in the first
place, specially when you realise that systems in Europe
have had such equipment for over a century. All talk of
200 km/h trains et. al. is meaningless without some way
to stop an intruding train. Or will it need a Rajdhani
or a Shatabdi to crash seriously (God forbid !) before
priorities are understood ?

A functioning AWS system can reduce the need to depend
on detonators, flares, radio, flashers, sirens (!?!),
special clearances and most other human-dependent
systems. IR was known to have tried out AWS in the
Mumbai Suburban region; does anyone know the status
of this ?

It has been pointed out that IR is still statistically
no more accident-prone than most other RR systems. However,
we need to not only be on par: we need to be far MORE
safe than other RRs if IR intends to continue operating
on its massive scale.

Also: is there information anywhere about major systems
and their use (or lack of use) of some form of AWS ?
The Chinese and the Russian networks,
for example ?


--
JS
--

From: Joydeep Dutta <>

Subject: Re: More Train Crash Updates

Date: 03 Aug 1999 23:44:41 -0500


Hi all
Since I reside at NewJalpaiguri I am deeply hurt at what happened.
It is a shame for N. F. Rly For the first time I heard of a head on
collision on a double line section with one train on the up and other is
on
the down line.
Trains usually run through Gaisal the accident site at 100km/h


>From: S Pai <s_pai@bigfoot.email
>To: Indian Railways List <irfca@cs.email
>Subject: Re: More Train Crash Updates
>Date: Mon, 2 Aug 1999 07:59:59 -0400
>
>Radio news I heard just now put the possible death toll at over 500 and
>injuries at over 1000. A railway official (didn't catch the name)
claimed
>that it was now thought that it was not a bomb blast by militants as
feared
>earlier, but a signals failure leading to a head-on collision.
>
>Seven coaches of the Brahmaputra Mail and six coaches of the Awadh
Assam
>Exp. were ripped apart! And the loco of the Awadh Assam was hurled
beyond
>the next track by the impact of the collision!! (Sadly, this comes
just as
>we were talking here about the telescoping properties, and
>collision-worthiness of integral coaches and the possibility of using
>tightlock couplers, etc. One can only hope that one thing to come out
of
>this tragedy might be some more attention focused on these aspects.)
>
>The Awadh Assam was apparently stationary at the platform when the
>Brahmaputra collided with it. If this is true, the most basic route
>interlocking and signalling mechanisms for the main-line / platform
loop at
>the station must have broken down completely. This sounds to me like
>either gross and criminal negligence in following basic procedures, or
else
>perhaps sabotage of some sort.
>
>--Satish
>
>
>


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From: SHRINIVAS V. JOSHI <>

Subject: Re: Nothing to do with........(Re: India train crash ...)

Date: 03 Aug 1999 23:48:51 -0500





On Wed, 4 Aug 1999, Harsh Vardhan wrote:

> I fully agree with Dheeraj. It is like twisting the issue out of shape
to
> produce an outlandish conclusion.
> 1) What if it turns out that all of those responsible for the accident
were
> high caste chaste hindus?

> 2) Once it happened that the behavior of the RPF/GRP was attributed to
the
> fact they they were mostly north indians. It finally turned out that
they
> were all mumble-bhais!(Thanks for this lovely expression KW)

That the concerned RPF , were Mumbaiwallas And this too was pointed out
by me in relevant mail, quoting the names from local newspapers. Not
that
, I hide those facts.

> One should think twice before shooting off the mouth, moreso if it is
going
> into bytes as in this case.

> Harsh


Dear Harsh,

This may have been one of the many factors for the present plight of
Railways & in other fields in general . And this was pointed out by Mr.
Pranav Roy in the StarNews at 22:00 yesterday, in discussion with
former
Railway safety expert. Infact he was telling many technical issues, but
he
couldn't refrain from discussing the reservation policy , which is going
on for so many years after 1947. And also, discussed was if this goes
on
, we may have more bad years ahead.

Anyway, whoever is involved must be brought to books, high caste or low
caste. And that is not exactly happening in our land. These things may
repeat now & then.


Shrinivas

From: Apurva Bahadur <>

Subject: Re: Anatomy of an Accident/ Text only version

Date: 04 Aug 1999 00:42:51 -0500




Muhammed Khan wrote:

> IRFCA:
> It was tragic that an avoidable accident was not avoided. The pain is
more
> when the media high lights that there is an accident every day on the
Indian
> Railways.
> I have tried to visualize what could be a hypothetical cause and is
attached
> as a word file. I think that beside the interesting discussions in
IRFCA, it
> should take more active part in railway safety, especially when it has
an
> international expertise in various disciplines.
> My sympathies with the families of the involved and prayer for those
no
> more with us.
> Muhammed
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> Name: ANATOMY OF AN ACCIDENT.doc
> ANATOMY OF AN ACCIDENT.doc Type: Winword File
(application/msword)
> Encoding: base64

From: Apurva Bahadur <>

Subject: Re: Nothing to do with........(Re: India train crash ...)

Date: 04 Aug 1999 00:52:30 -0500


While not wanting to add to the caste debate, I was told by a railway
official
that drivers from a certain class of society (the elegant word he used
is
'qualified' category) cannot be removed from service even if they commit
grave
mistakes. His observation was that this has prompted some people from
doing
reckless acts. He also regretted that this issue of reservation had
added a
unfortunate barrier in the camaraderie and the morale of the railwaymen.
I am quite sure that there is no official ruling on the relaxation of
disciplinary laws for some people.

Apurva

From: Jayant S <>

Subject: Re: The Gaisal disater

Date: 04 Aug 1999 01:01:47 -0500


From what I know:

"Dr. K.J. Walker" wrote:
> Does anyone know for cetain:
>1. What kind of signalling system is in use on the stretch.
Lower quadrant mechanical with interlocking. Today's sidebar in
the Indian Express says that the Kishanganj cabin was being
converted from mechanical to electrical relay, and possibly
the crossover points had been incorrectly locked. Which still
does not explain how the train passed two (?) more cabins
on the wrong side line.
> 2. Whether Gaisal station was indeed stut down and switched
> out at the time of the accident.
Operating, I read.
> 3. Whether either of the locos was fitted with a vigilance
> control system.
If you mean the driver vigiliance control device, then both
locos (presumably WDM2s) should have had them. However,
driver error is still believed likely considering the length
of wrong side running.
> 4. Whether (especially if the section is CTC controlled)
> there were track circuits.
Apparently not. The Indian press made a point out of the
lack of track circuiting.

--
JS
--

From: S.B.Mehta <>

Subject: Re: Few points from a memeber of Railway Safety

Date: 04 Aug 1999 01:13:25 -0500


Another amazing aspect which I feel has been overlooked is why didn't
the driver of AA Express notice that he was on the wrong track
because 16 kms at the speed which our trains run takes quite a while
to cover. He could have easily sensed that something was wrong and
could have taken precautionary action. So, dwelling on the subject of
pilfered equipment along the tracks becomes secondary in nature to
the point now raised. Also, did the driver of AA Exp. have
any sort of Memo saying that he will be diverted on the Up track
for the specified distance?

Sarosh

From: Anand Krishnan <>

Subject: Few points from a memeber of Railway Safety

Date: 04 Aug 1999 01:48:04 -0500


Hi all,

>Besides, one mustn't forget that every automatic device for safety can
and
>will be subverted because it is inconvenient, doesn't work properly, is
>hard or expensive to maintain, or hampers normal operation, etc.
Had anyone tuned in to Star News Channel last night between
7.00 pm
and 8.30p.m. There was one person from the Railway Safety Board
answering a
number of questions on-line. Very striking and important point that he
put
forward is that even the public had its share in many of the mishaps.
The
most irritating of all problems the railways was facing for a long time
was
a high rate of pilferage on rail equipments mainly that of signalling
and
traction equipemt. He said that even small parts of equipment that costs

Rs15-Rs20 were stolen from the tracks. He specially mentioned the
stretch
from Bihar to Assam and also a few parts in central India. Atleast in
this
aspect i think we should admit that it is true. There was another person

also who was interviewed by BBC who said the same thing. It was very
interesting discussion and he seemed to me that he knew what exactly he
was
talking about. He reasoned overworking, fatigue on the part of the
railway
staff, even the weather. He said that the staff would not have bothered
to
go out in the cold and rain and check personally and assumed that since
the
train passed thru their station in the proper time, that things would
have
been o.k. But 16 k.m on a wrong track passing thru 3 stations en route
is
unbeleivable he added.

Kind regards,
Anand


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From: Joydeep Dutta <>

Subject: Poor loco drivers of NF RLY

Date: 04 Aug 1999 02:50:03 -0500



Hi all
Being a resident of NewJalpaiguri I can tell you that the Avadh Assam
driver though dead should also be held responsible for such running on
wrong
track. Again if a up train runs on the down line he faces no
outer-warner,
home , starter and advanced starter signal( the particular section is on

two-aspect conventional signalling system, though tokenless). One can
run on
the wrong line between two station under special line clear but to pass
through three station at speed means the Avadh driver who belongs to
Katihar
was just going against the rules. I believe strongly in the fact that

" A driver is the first man who can destroy a train and the last man
who can save a train"
Unless our society respects our drivers and they are given their proper
esteem with more educated fellows in the profession; these things will
continue to happen.

Joydeep

>From: "Anand Krishnan" <krish_nand@hotmail.email
>To: irfca@cs.email
>Subject: Few points from a memeber of Railway Safety
>Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 08:48:04 IST
>
>Hi all,
>
>>Besides, one mustn't forget that every automatic device for safety can
and
>>will be subverted because it is inconvenient, doesn't work properly,
is
>>hard or expensive to maintain, or hampers normal operation, etc.
> Had anyone tuned in to Star News Channel last night between
7.00
>pm
>and 8.30p.m. There was one person from the Railway Safety Board
answering a
>number of questions on-line. Very striking and important point that he
put
>forward is that even the public had its share in many of the mishaps.
The
>most irritating of all problems the railways was facing for a long time
was
>a high rate of pilferage on rail equipments mainly that of signalling
and
>traction equipemt. He said that even small parts of equipment that
costs
>Rs15-Rs20 were stolen from the tracks. He specially mentioned the
stretch
>from Bihar to Assam and also a few parts in central India. Atleast in
this
>aspect i think we should admit that it is true. There was another
person
>also who was interviewed by BBC who said the same thing. It was very
>interesting discussion and he seemed to me that he knew what exactly he
was
>talking about. He reasoned overworking, fatigue on the part of the
railway
>staff, even the weather. He said that the staff would not have bothered
to
>go out in the cold and rain and check personally and assumed that since
the
>train passed thru their station in the proper time, that things would
have
>been o.k. But 16 k.m on a wrong track passing thru 3 stations en route
is
>unbeleivable he added.
>
>Kind regards,
>Anand
>
>
>______________________________________________________
>Get Your Private, Free Email at <A HREF="http://www.hotmail.com">http://www.hotmail.com</A>


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From: Apurva Bahadur <>

Subject: Re: The Gaisal disater

Date: 04 Aug 1999 03:34:35 -0500




Jayant S wrote:

> >From what I know:
>
> "Dr. K.J. Walker" wrote:
> > Does anyone know for cetain:
> >1. What kind of signalling system is in use on the stretch.
> Lower quadrant mechanical with interlocking. Today's sidebar in
> the Indian Express says that the Kishanganj cabin was being
> converted from mechanical to electrical relay, and possibly
> the crossover points had been incorrectly locked. Which still
> does not explain how the train passed two (?) more cabins
> on the wrong side line.

My guess - the drivers were sleeping - a driver working this
line
everyday knows the way very well - there is no way that they
can be
diverted on the wrong line and not take corrective action. Did
the
train enter the wrong line at high speeds or was it done at
the
correct speed i.e. 15 Kmph over facing points at Kishanganj ?
I remember a driver on the Pune - Kolhapur line who watched a
pumpkin grow by the side of the line - they are THAT
attentive.
However his colleague (presumably sleeping) while working the
Up
Mahalaxmi exp passed a distant signal a danger and nearly
collided
with the standing Sahyadri express except for the last minute
changing of the points by the cabinman and the urgent braking
by
the guard - that would have been the accident of similar
proportions. Except that PA - KOP is single line and the
Gaisal
track (I was surprised to know) is double lined. Any idea what
caused the fire ? The TV pics show three coaches piled one top
of
another, the top one has had its paint burnt off.

> > 2. Whether Gaisal station was indeed stut down and switched
> > out at the time of the accident.
> Operating, I read.
> > 3. Whether either of the locos was fitted with a vigilance
> > control system.

> If you mean the driver vigiliance control device, then both
> locos (presumably WDM2s) should have had them.

The locos were indeed WDM2s but I have never seen a working
vigilance control in one. The original Alcos had some sort of
pneumatic system, I think it was a dead man's pedal but it has
been
removed for decades. There is a dead man's relay (DMR) which
forms
the heart of the engine safety circuit in a WDM 2 but it is
connected to the various safety switches rather than a
vigilance
control. Maybe Joydeep can comment on this issue.

Apurva

From: Apurva Bahadur <>

Subject: Re: More Train Crash Updates

Date: 04 Aug 1999 03:50:59 -0500


> For the first time I heard of a head on
> collision on a double line section with one train on the up and other
is on
> the down line.

The collision in the Bhor ghats between Down Udyan Express (early 1980s)
and the
512 up parcel special was caused by the Udyan being switched to the 3rd
line.
Neither cabinman nor the station master of Palasdhari realised that this
cannot
be done. The Udyan driver (who survived the crash) thought that this was
some
new procedure on the newly opened 3rd line. The person manning the
Jhambrung
cabin called the VT power controller with the news that the Udyan was
working
the wrong line, but was ticked off for reporting wrong things under the
influence of alcohol. Even at this stage just cutting off the OHE would
have
saved the mishap.
Recovery of the bodies from the Udyan look better part of a week as this
area is
in the middle of ghats and not approachable by road. Even after so many
years,
the Udyan coaches still lie rusting at the eerie spot just between two
viaducts
to remind us about the price of working with inadequate knowledge.

Apurva

From: raymond/Polaris <>

Subject: The Gaisal Crash

Date: 04 Aug 1999 05:53:20 -0500




Hi gang,

Not a very cheery hi there for obvious reasons. Just a few points :

a) Regarding running on the "other" line in a doubled section : Two
instances I
remember. The first is on the Palwal - New Delhi stretch which was four
tracked
at the time of my travel. I was going to NDLS on the Paschim from BCT.
This was
put on the second line. The outermost was a goods going towards DLI.
Then
somewhere near Faridabad the BCT-NDLS Rajdhani passed us like we were
standing.
So at that moment there were three trains travelling towards DLI. This
was in
1989 or so.

The second instance was in 1991. Coming back to Madras by the Coromandel
Express
from Howrah, running 4 hours late at BZA. Between Nellore and Gudur, we
were put
onto the "other" line, and ran past a slow moving coal goods train. A
couple of
stations later, we were put back onto the "right" line. The train did
not stop
to pick up authorisation or anything like that.

Maybe in the Gaisal case, there was another slow moving goods train on
the track
which had already left Kishangang, and the SM wanted to speed up the
already
late AA Exp. But then someone forgot to stop the Brahmaputra Mail at the
appropriate station.

b) There was this thing about caste. I do not deny that there might be
some
truth to it. In fact, my driver friend from BZA did go in for early
retirement
because he thought he would not go any higher. But I felt that this was
one
mailing list which need not get into the morass which the rest of the
country is
busy trying to get out off.

c) I do not think that there was any way of stopping the AA Exp. once it
got
onto the other track. Remember it was raining, and the cabinman would
have just
assumed that the AA exp. went through on the right track. This track
would
anyway have been cleared for the Mail. Bang.

Some feedback on this, gang ?

Raymond Arogyaswamy

From: Jishnu Mukerji <>

Subject: Re: AWS and Accident Prevention

Date: 04 Aug 1999 09:09:29 -0500


Jayant S wrote:
>
> Jishnu Mukerji wrote:
> > Well said! It seems to me that all indications are that every
possible
> > safety interlocking was worked around to get the AA Express onto the
> > down track in this case. Why would this be less likely if even more
> > interlocking was in place? I think the fundamental issue of
inculcating
> > a sense of responsibility and discipline in the entire human chain
of
> > operation is being overlooked.
>
> Yes, either that, or a vital technology input that can
> reduce the number of accidents caused by human failure: I
> mean AWS (automatic warning system) installations that can
> stop a train automatically if it enters an occupied section.
> Mechanical systems, even if interlocked, would depend on
> signalmen and drivers; track circuiting and automatic signalling
> still puts the onus on drivers. AWS should remove that last
> human link. Individual vigiliance and responsibility are
> important, certainly, but there has to be a last-ditch
> safeguard against mistakes.

Am I correct in surmising from the description it seems to me that by
AWS you really mean ATS (Automatic Train Stop) system. Are such things
called AWS in India? Such things are called PTS (Positive Train Stop)
systems in this part of the world. Then there are automatic speed limit
enforcement systems too that are called something like ATC. For example,
the North East Corridor in the USA is equipped with cab signalling and
ATC that ensures that no train passes a signal at a speed higher than
that permitted by the aspect of the signal. Currently the signalling
system is being upgraded from a 5 aspect to a 9 aspect system allowing
finer control over train speeds and hence denser packing of trains. In
addition, in the New Jersey portion of the NEC an additional system
called PTS, which makes absolutely sure that the train comes to a dead
stop at a stop signal is being installed. Apparently the existing ATC
allows trains running at less than 10 mph to pass by a red signal
unhindered. But all this fancy protection systems cause mucho dinero,
and it is not clear from where all the financial resources will
materialize to isntall this sort of stuff all over India, say in places
like Gaisal.

Anyway, electronic AWS systems of any ilk (I suppose other than those
based on GPS) depend on the proper functioning of track-side
transponders, which typically contain much iron and copper, favorite
things for thieves. I suspect that unless the theft problem is solved,
installing AWS transponders in remote areas will probably mean that
often trains will be operating under special rules that apply when AWS
has been disabled due to theft. So still there will be a significant
human element to deal with.

> I have not understood why introduction of AWS in India
> is not linked with that of track circuiting in the first
> place, specially when you realise that systems in Europe
> have had such equipment for over a century. All talk of
> 200 km/h trains et. al. is meaningless without some way
> to stop an intruding train. Or will it need a Rajdhani
> or a Shatabdi to crash seriously (God forbid !) before
> priorities are understood ?

I am sure it has something to do with the availability fo financial
resources. In the USA trains are not allowed to operate at speeds above
79mph on tracks that are not equipped with cab signalling and some sort
of automatic train stop system. Indian Railways already allows speeds
higher than that without such equipment, as do many other countries
including the UK. The Southall crash of a GWR HST was in 125 mph
territory and the train did not have operative AWS of any kind.

> A functioning AWS system can reduce the need to depend
> on detonators, flares, radio, flashers, sirens (!?!),
> special clearances and most other human-dependent
> systems. IR was known to have tried out AWS in the
> Mumbai Suburban region; does anyone know the status
> of this ?

Strictly speaking that is true, but such dependence is not entirely
eliminated. All automatic systems fail from time to time and that cause
fallback on more primitive systems. Typically accidents happen when
something goes wrong, not when everything is working fine. Hence even in
the rpesence of the most sophisticated systems, procedures must be in
palce to operate safely when they malfunction. It appears now that one
of the proximate causes of AA Exp finding itself on the wrong track may
have been a breakdown of interlocking at Kishanganj. The effect of the
initial breakdown appears to have been multiplied by the inability on
part of the humans involved to take corrective action in a timely
manner.

> It has been pointed out that IR is still statistically
> no more accident-prone than most other RR systems. However,
> we need to not only be on par: we need to be far MORE
> safe than other RRs if IR intends to continue operating
> on its massive scale.
>
> Also: is there information anywhere about major systems
> and their use (or lack of use) of some form of AWS ?
> The
> Chinese and the Russian networks, for example ?

Don't need to go all the way to China and Russia (well actually I
suppose they are closer to India than the UK). The United Kingdom has
failed to install and operate AWS consistently on its trains, in spite
of multiple recommendations from Her Majesty's Health and Safety
whatever they call it, and they blithly operate at upto 200 kmph, just
to give you one example!:-(

Jishnu.

From: Dr. K.J. Walker <>

Subject: The Gaisal disater

Date: 04 Aug 1999 10:08:03 -0500


Dear everyone,
    Does anyone know for cetain:
         1. What kind of signalling system is in use on the stretch.
         2. Whether Gaisal station was indeed stut down and switched out at the time of the accident.
         3. Whether either of the locos was fitted with a vigilance control system.
         4. Whether (especially if the section is CTC controlled) there were track circuits.
    Cheers

From: Vijay Balasubramanian <>

Subject: Re: The Gaisal Crash

Date: 04 Aug 1999 10:38:02 -0500


I, too, can recall a few instances of traveling on the "other" line
b'coz of section unavailability
due to derailment or OHE failure. However, this was carried out in a
well-planned, systematic
manner with our train running at slow-to-moderate speeds on the "wrong"
line and being promptly
switched back to the correct track after the trouble zone. In some
cases, there was a train
waiting patiently on the other track close to the switch-back point.
So, no confusion there (thank
goodness!!)

Once our DehraDun bound Doon exp. was detained at Gujhandi for a few
hours in the wee hours
of the morning. Then the train actually reserved out of the station and
was switched onto the other
line - it changed directions again, passed a derailed goods train and
was switched back at the very
next station. On a more recent journey, our TVC bound Rajdhani exp.
changed tracks somewhere
between Bitragunta and Nellore - we passed an OHE maintenance car on the
other track (the OHE
must have failed on this section) and then got switched back to the Up
line just a few feet before the
waiting Navjeevan Exp. on the Dn line.

>
>c) I do not think that there was any way of stopping the AA Exp. once
it got
>onto the other track. Remember it was raining, and the cabinman would
have
>just
>assumed that the AA exp. went through on the right track. This track
would
>anyway have been cleared for the Mail. Bang.
>
>Some feedback on this, gang ?
>
Why is that? What signals apply to a train traveling on the wrong track
of a double line?

What is not clear in the Gaisal tragedy is whether the AA Exp. switch to
the Up line was intentional or
accidental. In either case, the Brahmaputra Mail should have seen a
signal at danger, right? Seems to
me that there was a signal failure at Gaisal north or the Mail's driver
failed to respond to a red signal.
Since the AA did come to a halt at Gaisal, the conjecture about asleep
drivers may be wrong (unless they
woke up but too late!!)


Vijay
>
>
>Raymond Arogyaswamy
>
>

From: Shanku Niyogi <>

Subject: Traveller's thoughts on IR

Date: 04 Aug 1999 11:18:04 -0500


Here's a page BBC put up to gather thoughts of travellers about IR:

<A HREF="http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_410000/410944.s">http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_410000/410944.s</A>
tm

From: Larry Russell <>

Subject: Re: More Train Crash Updates

Date: 04 Aug 1999 13:13:52 -0500


Greetings. Do you know which locomotives were involved?
Larry

Joydeep Dutta wrote:

> Hi all
> Since I reside at NewJalpaiguri I am deeply hurt at what happened.
> It is a shame for N. F. Rly For the first time I heard of a head on
> collision on a double line section with one train on the up and other
is on
> the down line.
> Trains usually run through Gaisal the accident site at 100km/h
>
> >From: S Pai <s_pai@bigfoot.email
> >To: Indian Railways List <irfca@cs.email
> >Subject: Re: More Train Crash Updates
> >Date: Mon, 2 Aug 1999 07:59:59 -0400
> >
> >Radio news I heard just now put the possible death toll at over 500
and
> >injuries at over 1000. A railway official (didn't catch the name)
claimed
> >that it was now thought that it was not a bomb blast by militants as
feared
> >earlier, but a signals failure leading to a head-on collision.
> >
> >Seven coaches of the Brahmaputra Mail and six coaches of the Awadh
Assam
> >Exp. were ripped apart! And the loco of the Awadh Assam was hurled
beyond
> >the next track by the impact of the collision!! (Sadly, this comes
just as
> >we were talking here about the telescoping properties, and
> >collision-worthiness of integral coaches and the possibility of using
> >tightlock couplers, etc. One can only hope that one thing to come
out of
> >this tragedy might be some more attention focused on these aspects.)
> >
> >The Awadh Assam was apparently stationary at the platform when the
> >Brahmaputra collided with it. If this is true, the most basic route
> >interlocking and signalling mechanisms for the main-line / platform
loop at
> >the station must have broken down completely. This sounds to me like
> >either gross and criminal negligence in following basic procedures,
or else
> >perhaps sabotage of some sort.
> >
> >--Satish
> >
> >
> >
>
> ______________________________________________________
> Get Your Private, Free Email at <A HREF="http://www.hotmail.com">http://www.hotmail.com</A>

From: S.Shankar <>

Subject: Index

Date: 04 Aug 1999 13:18:06 -0500


Hello,
As I go along, slowly but steadily, learning the roots of web page
creation, I have put together an index of the two pages I have created
so far.

I will add to it, as and when I add more pages.

Like Apurva bahadur, I too will send you only the index page in future,
with the latest page right at the bottom.

Check it out at:

<A HREF="http://members.tripod.com/shankaronline/index.htm">http://members.tripod.com/shankaronline/index.htm</A>

I'm still having problems with getting the script to behave and to stay
united and on one line (sounds a bit like the Indian population?!), but
I will work on it.

I'm now working to put my WP page back again, but before that, plan to
have my emu page up and running, along with an ac traction page.

Stay tuned.

Best regards.

Shankar.

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